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Leibson: Wrongful Dishonor Under the UCC

WRONGFUL DISHONOR UNDER THE UCC:
A TRIP THROUGH THE MAZE OF 4-402
DAVID J. LEIBSON*
CLASS is ready to consider
Section 4-402 of the Uniform Commercial Code, I always like to
start out by asking if anyone would have worded the language differently
had they been drafting the section. Usually one of the first responses is to
the
effect that 4-402 is fine just the way it is because a bank should be
made
to answer to its customer if it fails to honor a properly
payable

W

HEN MY NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS

item drawn upon it. My response to such an answer is twofold. First, I
wholeheartedly agree that a bank should be held responsible for such
a failure; and with regard to liability, 4-402 merely states a proposition
that is at least more than two centuries old.'
But my second response is usually in the form of a question. Just
what is the measure of damages recoverable under 4-402? Or perhaps
there is an even more important question to ask: Have the drafters, in
their wording of 4-402, given lawyers a basis for predicting with any
degree of certainty just what the courts will allow customers to recover in
the event of a wrongful dishonor? I submit that they have not, and usually
after discussing a few of the cases that have been decided under the
section my students either agree with me or are confused enough to at
least agree that 4-402 is not an example of model draftsmanship.
Section 4-402 is captioned Bank's Liability to Customer for Wrongful
Dishonor. It reads as follows:
A payor bank is liable to its customer for damages proximately
caused by the wrongful dishonor of an item. When the dishonor
occurs through mistake liability is limited to actual damages proved.
If so proximately caused and proved damages may include damages
for an arrest or prosecution of the customer or other consequential
damages. Whether any consequential damages are proximately
caused by the wrongful2 dishonor is a question of fact to be
determined in each case.
Two questions come to mind upon reading the language. Does 4-402
provide for two different types of dishonor, "wrongful dishonor" and
"dishonor by mistake," and do the drafters intend "actual damages"
and "consequential damages" to be exclusive of one another?. One solution
to these questions could be arrived at with an analysis along the following
lines: Section 1-109 and the comments to that section make it clear that
* B.A., Vanderbilt University (cum laude); J.D., University of Louisville (curm laude);
LLM., Harvard University; Assistant Professor of Law, University of Louisville.
1 Marzetti v. Williams, 109 Eng. Rep. 842 (K.B. 1830).
2 UMFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-402.
[3171
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section captions are to be considered parts of the UCC and not mere
surplusage. The caption to 4-402 predicates the customer's cause of action
upon wrongful dishonor and wrongful dishonor only, thus there should be
no distinction between wrongful dishonor and dishonor by mistake. In
addition, actual damages, as that term is defined in Black's Law
Dictionary, means "[r]eal, substantial and just damages, or the amount
awarded to a complainant in compensation for his actual and real loss or
injury, as opposed on the one hand to 'nominal' damages and on the other
hand to 'exemplary' or 'punitive' damages. ' 3 Consequential damages, as
defined by Black's Law Dictionary, means "[s]uch damage, loss, or injury
as does not flow directly and immediately from the act of the party, but
only from some of the consequences or results of such an act."' 4 It is
certainly reasonable and proper to assert that actual damages can include
consequential damages, as these terms are generally defined, and thus just
as there are not two different causes of action in 4-402, there also are not
two different types of damages. Rather there is one cause of action, wrongful
dishonor, and all damages proximately caused by such wrongful dishonor
are recoverable. In my opinion this is exactly what the drafters intended.
However, it seems to me that a plausible rebuttal may be made to
this analysis. Just as the section caption is not to be considered mere
surplusage, neither should any part of the language of the statute be
considered such. Thus, just the same as any other statute, the Uniform
Commercial Code should be read so as to give effect to all of the language
therein. The drafters have in fact used the terms "wrongful dishonor" and
"dishonor by mistake," and "actual damages" and "consequential
damages" and there is no requirement for lawyers or judges to equate
these terms. In fact, because there is nothing in the comments to 4-402
to indicate that these terms are to be considered synonymous, are we not
under a duty to give each an independent meaning? If so, then a distinction
must be made between wrongful dishonor and dishonor by mistake, and,
depending upon the facts of each case, the measure of damages owed by
a bank when it fails to honor a properly payable item will be predicated
upon the nature and degree of 'the bank's actions.
Regardless of which of the above analyses you want to accept, it is
most important to consider what the courts have done with this section,
and to see if any measure of predictability has sprung from the cases.
The classic textbook case regarding wrongful dishonor and the
application of 4-402 is Loucks v. Albuquerque National Bank.5 PlaintiffAppellants Loucks and Martinez were partners in the L & M Paint and
Body Shop. The partnership maintained a checking account in the
defendant bank. Loucks was personally indebted to the bank in the sum of
3 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 467 (4th
4
BLACK'S LAW DIcTIONARY 467 (4th

ed. 1951).
ed. 1951).

576 N.M. 735, 418 P.2d 191 (1966).
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$402, and the bank charged that amount to the partnership account
knowing full well that the debt was not a partnership obligation.
Subsequently the bank dishonored a number of checks drawn by the
partnership due to insufficient funds in the account. The insufficiency, of
course, was due to the debit of the $402.
Plaintiffs, as partners, sued the bank for four separate items: (1) the
$402 which was wrongfully charged; (2) $5,000 for damages done to
the partnership reputation due to the stigma of issuing bad checks;
(3) $1,800 for loss of income caused by the inability of Mr. Loucks to
work because of illness, and (4) $14,000 in punitive damages. In
addition, Mr. Loucks sued individually for $25,000 in damages incurred
because of an ulcer caused by the wrongful acts of the defendant.
After proof was heard at the trial level, the trial court dismissed all
of the above claims except the one for the $402. That claim was sent to
the jury which promptly found for the plaintiffs. The trial court
dismissed the claim for the punitive damages on the basis that there was
no evidence to prove any wilful or wanton conduct on the part of the
defendant in dishonoring the checks. It dismissed the $5,000 claim for
damages to reputation for lack of evidence even though plaintiffs proved
that after the dishonor the partnership was denied credit at various places
and that other creditors and potential creditors who either knew of or had
been victimized by the dishonors refused to accept anything but cash from
the partnership. Mr. Loucks' claim for the ulcer damage and the
partnership claim for damages caused to the business due to Loucks'
inability to work were dismissed because the trial court ruled that
Mr. Loucks had no standing under 4-402. It held that the partnership
and not Loucks himself was the customer of the defendant bank.
The Supreme Court of New Mexico upheld the trial court's decision
on the punitive damage claim, and its decision that the partnership was
the defendant's customer and thus, in a wrongful dishonor claim, the
6
individual partners had no right of recovery. In addition it held that
the partnership itself had no right in a wrongful dishonor action to
recover $1,800 lost income because it had no right to recover for injuries
to one of the partners, and because no substantial evidence had been
presented to link Loucks' inability to work with the bank's actions.' There
can be no quarrel with this part of the decision if there was in fact no
evidence to sustain the $1,800 claim. But the court implied that even had
e The question of who should be able to qualify as a customer is not within the
primary scope of this article, but it would seem that a person in Loucks' position
should successfully be able to argue that a person who handles and directs the
financial affairs of a business, signing the checks and vouching for the fiscal
responsibility of the organization, puts his own reputation on the line and will be
damaged by a wrongful dishonor. Thus if a bank has knowledge of such a situation
(and such knowledge would be obvious in a two-man partnership), then the definition
of "customer" should be expanded so as to encompass the partners.
776 N.M. at 746,418 P.2d at 199.
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there been evidence to support the claim, the partnership could not have
recovered because it had no right to recover damages caused by personal
injuries to one of the partners. This seems clearly inconsistent with the
language of 4-402 because it is obvious that such injury to an individual
partner would amount to an injury to the partnership and would be
encompassed by the classical definition of consequential damages (assuming, of course, that the ulcer could be proximately related to the dishonor).
With regard to the $5,000 damage to reputation claim, the Supreme
Court of New Mexico held that there was sufficient evidence to provide
a jury issue and remanded the case to the trial court for a new trial
on that matter. However, in remanding the case the court used language
which seems to indicate that it was distinguishing dishonor by mistake
and wrongful dishonor.
If we can say as a matter of law that the dishonor here occurred
-through mistake, then the damages would be limited to the "actual
damages proved." Even if we are able to agree, as contended by
defendants in their answer brief, that the defendants acted under a
mistake of fact in "... . that Mr. Kopp acting on behalf of the bank
thought that the money was invested in the partnership and could
be traced directly from Mr. Martinez to the L & M Paint and Body
Shop," still the defendants cannot rely on such mistake after both
Mr. Martinez and Mr. Loucks informed them on March 15th and
18th that this was a personal obligation of Mr. Martinez and that the
partnership had outstanding checks. At least it then became a
question -for the jury to decide whether or not defendants had
wrongfully dishonored the checks through mistake.8
This language clearly indicates the court's feeling that the bank's actions
could have amounted to more than just a mistake, and if they did, that the
partnership could recover more than "actual damages proved," which
undoubtedly referred to the $402. Thus the court allowed the jury to
consider the damage to reputation question. I do not believe that the
drafters intended such a dichotomy when they drafted 4-402. I believe
that regardless of the reasons for the dishonor the partnership should
have been able to recover the $402 plus any damage to reputation or lost
income attributable to the dishonor. Such a conclusion is not only good
contract law, but the most equitable way to decide the matter and place
the wronged party, the partnership, back into the position it would have
been had the bank not dishonored the instruments.
Despite the fact that the best analysis of 4-402 envisions only one
cause of action and one measure of damages, there is at least one recent
case that has accepted Loucks for the proposition that "wrongful
dishonor" and "dishonor by mistake" are two separate and distinct types
of deeds and that the measure of damage for each is different. Not
surprisingly, the case is another New Mexico case and it cites Loucks as
8 76 N.M. at 745,418 P.2d at 198.
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authority. In Allison v. First National Bank,9 the New Mexico Court
of Appeals defined wrongful dishonor as "a dishonor done in a wrong
manner, unjustly, unfair, in a manner contrary to justice."' 1 It defined
mistaken dishonor as "a dishonor done erroneously, unintentionally, a
state of mind that is not in accord with the facts."" It then went on to
find that the defendant wrongfully dishonored the instrument and thus
plaintiff was entitled to recover consequential damages.
Between the dates of the Loucks and Allison decisions, three other
cases have been decided on this particular point. In Skov v. Chase
Manhattan Bank,12 Theodore Skov was the proprietor of a fish market and
issued a check to one of his suppliers, which check was dishonored by the
defendant bank. Because of this the supplier refused to deal further with
Skov. Skov sued the bank, arguing for the right to recover the profits
which would be lost to him because of the loss of this supplier. He
projected the loss of profits over a period of years. Such damages seem
clearly more analogous to the business reputation damages in Loucks than
the $402 actual loss of the wrongly debited debt. Such damages seem
clearly more "consequential" than "actual" as those two terms were
applied in Loucks and Allison. Thus for the Third Circuit to have decided
Skov consistently with Loucks it seems it would have had to find that the
bank's actions constituted wrongful dishonor in order to allow Mr. Skov
to recover. The trial court had not so found. It found that the dishonor
was due to the bank's mistake, but nevertheless allowed Mr. Skov to
recover his lost profits over the projected period. The Third Circuit
affirmed and in doing so used the following language: "The trial judge
properly relied on Section 4-402 of the Uniform Commercial Code...
which is not a model of clarity in its reference to 'damages proximately
caused,' 'actual damages proved,' and 'consequential damages.... "
(emphasis added),13 The court then went on to cite Loucks as authority
for its decision allowing Skov the right to recover damages projected
over a prolonged period. In this respect I agree that Skov is consistent
with Loucks because both the projected loss of profits and the loss of
business reputation are proper examples of consequential damages, if
proved. However, the Third Circuit failed to wrestle with the question
of whether there was a distinction between wrongful dishonor and
dishonor by mistake. Perhaps it would be fair to say that, in light of
the above quoted language from the opinion, the only problem the
Third Circuit saw with regard to 4-402 was the measure of damages,
and that it took for granted the fact that the drafters intended no
distinction between wrongful dishonor and dishonor by mistake.
9 85 N.M. 283, 511 P.2d 769 (1973), rev'd on other grounds, 85 N.M. 511, 514 P.2d 30

(1973).
10 Id. at 287, 511 P.2d at 773.
1 Id.
12407 F.2d 1318 (3d Cir. 1969).
13 Id. at 1319.
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Shortly before Skov was decided, the Kentucky Court of Appeals4
rendered an opinion on this subject in Bank of Louisville Royal v. Sims.1
In that case the bank failed to honor two small checks drawn on it by
Sims. She sued under 4-402 and recovered $631.50, which sum included
the following items: $1.50 for a telephone call (presumably to try to get the
check situation straightened out); $500 for "illness, harassment, embarrassment and inconvenience"; and $130 for two weeks' lost wages. The
Court of Appeals reversed and directed the trial court to enter judgment
for the plaintiff-customer in the amount of $1.50, the charge for the
telephone call. In the course of its short opinion the court noted that
the trial court found that the dishonor was due to a mistake and was not
malicious. If the Kentucky court was going to construe 4-402 the same
way as the New Mexico court, it could have stopped right there and
concluded that as this was merely a mistake, the $1.50 phone call was the
only actual damage done and in the absence of any intentional act on
the part of the bank, "consequential damages" would not be in order.
However, the Kentucky court, to its credit, did not attempt that line of
reasoning. Rather, it based its decision on the concept of foreseeability
saying: "This statute [4-402] does not define 'consequential' damages but
15
dishonor.'
it is clear they must be proximately caused by the wrongful
It then said that the nervousness, sickness and lost wages suffered by Sims
as a result of the dishonor were not reasonably foreseeable and thus not a
properly recoverable item given the fact situation. Regardless of whether
one agrees or disagrees with the court's decision as to the foreseeability of
these damages, it seems clear that the Kentucky court was not interested
in making a distinction between "wrongful dishonor" and "dishonor by
mistake," nor did it quarrel with the argument that "actual" damages
could include "consequential" damages.
The last case pertinent to this discussion is American Fletcher Bank
6
& Trust Co. v. Flick. As in Loucks, the customer sued not only for the
amount of money wrongly debited to his account, but also for the damage
to his business and credit reputation. Judgment for over $18,000 was
entered for Flick but the Indiana Appellate Court reversed because, in its
opinion, Flick did not present sufficient evidence to substantiate the
verdict. As to its analysis of 4-402 and Loucks, the Indiana Court
considered the matter much the same as the Third Circuit did in Skov.
Additionally, the second sentence of the statute [4-402] creates
confusion as to whether "actual damages" include or are separate and
distinct from "consequential damages," as the latter term is contained
in said statute.... [W]e construe it [4-402] to permit recovery of
monetary compensation for any [court's emphasis] actual or consequential harm, loss or injury proximately caused by a wrongful
14 435

S.W.2d 57 (Ky. 1968).

15 Id.
16

146 Ind. App. 122,252 N.E.2d 839 (1969).
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dishonor [citing Loucks]. We believe in this respect that labels such
as "actual" or "consequential" are less than meaningful in the sense
of the compensability of harm, injury or loss proximately caused
17
by wrongful dishonor.
The Indiana court, as the Third Circuit, either did not consider or want to
consider the possibility that the New Mexico court believed that there was
a distinction between "wrongful dishonor" and "dishonor by mistake."
Let's return to the question posed near the beginning of this article.
Has any measure of predictability sprung from the cases that have wrestled
with 4-402? I suppose one could argue that if you practice in New Mexico
you will surely be confronted with the question of whether the dishonor
was wrongful or because of a mistake and damages will be awarded
accordingly. On the other hand, if you practice in Kentucky, Indiana or
any Third Circuit state you will probably be able to tell your client that a
customer will be able to recover all damages proximately caused no matter
what the nature of the dishonor. However, this is small comfort for a
lawyer practicing in one of the many states that have not been confronted
by this problem. It is unfortunate that the drafters did not try to remedy
the problems caused by the present language of 4-402 when the 1972
Amendments to the Uniform Commercial Code were written. It cannot be
doubted that the drafters had some measure of damage in mind when
4-402 was originally drawn. It is probable that, even in the face of a strong
bank lobby, they intended the courts to interpret this section in favor of
the customer whenever possible and to allow the customer to recover all
damages caused by the dishonor. It is obvious that they did not intend for
lawyers and courts to spend such a large amount of time and effort
arguing the meaning of all of the terms incorporated into this short
section. That they have failed in this latter goal is clear from our study of
the cited cases. Section 4-402 still remains a maze that will be stumbled
through and misinterpreted until the language is clarified.

17

Id. at 132,252 N.E.2d at 845.
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